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B rexit itself may challenge the ambition of growth in the tech industry in a number of important ways. For instance, 
the UK may find it difficult to attract 
the skilled staff necessary to continue 
growing at the current rate, particularly 
given the impact of Brexit on the 
university sector which is expected to help 
to sustain this growth. Early indications 
also seem to suggest that investors in 
the tech industry are developing cold 
feet, which might have an impact on 
the UK’s much-lauded ability to nurture 
tech unicorns. 
Perhaps the most significant implication 
of Brexit for the tech industry will 
however be its impact on the cross-border 
data flows that underpin key components 
of this industry, such as cyber-security, 
data analytics and artificial intelligence. 
At present, the UK, like other EU/EEA 
countries, benefits from a presumption 
that its data protection regime offers 
an adequate level of data protection 
to individuals. This presumption will fall 
away once the UK leaves the EU unless 
it retains EEA membership. In order to 
maintain personal data flows between 
the EU and the UK, the UK will therefore 
need to prove that it offers an ‘adequate’ 
level of personal data protection, a 
standard that is likely to prove illusive in 
light of recent jurisprudence of the EU 
Court of Justice. This is one crucial policy 
area where having one’s cake and eating 
it may prove to be impossible, leaving the 
UK in the unenviable position of having 
to chose between, on the one hand, its 
preferred standards of data protection 
and privacy (typically below EU standards) 
and, on the other, the free flow of 
personal data sustaining the domestic 
tech industry. 
Relevant EU legal 
framework
Until 2009, and the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, EU data protection 
law was comprised solely of secondary 
legislation, most notably the 1995 
Data Protection Directive. This 
legislation was justified on the grounds 
that a uniform level of fundamental 
rights protection was necessary in order 
to ensure the free flow of personal 
data in the EU’s internal market. This 
secondary legislation has subsequently 
been reinforced, and its fundamental 
rights dimension pushed to the fore, 
by the introduction of a right to 
data protection in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and a specific legal 
basis for data protection in Article 16 
TFEU. These provisions therefore reflect 
the ‘mainstreaming’ of the right to data 
protection across areas of EU policy, 
and its new standing in the EU legal 
order. The EU Court of Justice has 
been eager to embrace these new 
legal provisions. Indeed, the seminal 
cases where the Charter was invoked 
to invalidate provisions of EU secondary 
legislation and, subsequently, an 
entire legislative instrument, on the 
basis of incompatibility with the EU 
Charter both involved the right to data 
protection.
These EU provisions – both primary 
and secondary – have received a 
mixed welcome in the UK’s domestic 
legal order. The 1995 Data Protection 
Directive was implemented by the 
Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 
1998). However, whether the DPA 
1998 has been correctly implemented 
is a matter of longstanding dispute. 
Indeed, the European Commission 
has been investigating the UK for an 
infringement of its data protection 
obligations since at least 2010. 
While both the UK and the EU have 
remained tight-lipped regarding the 
status of these proceedings, the 
Commission investigations remain 
ongoing. According to materials 
obtained via freedom of information/
access to documents requests by Dr 
Chris Pounder, key elements of the 
data protection framework such as the 
notion of ‘personal data’ and a ‘filing 
system’ remain incorrectly implemented 
while there are several problems 
relating to the enforcement of data 
protection rights in the UK. The UK’s 
implementation of the EU’s E-Privacy 
Directive, a lex specialis that sets out 
rules for privacy in the context of certain 
electronic communications, has also 
culminated in a European Commission 
infringement investigation . 
These discrepancies contribute to the 
impression that the UK has adopted a 
lowest common denominator approach 
to data protection. 
The right to data protection initially 
received a similarly sceptical reception 
into the domestic legal order. There 
is traditionally no right to privacy or 
data protection in the UK legal order, 
although the right to privacy has 
been gradually incorporated by the 
jurisprudence of the courts. However, 
the right to data protection is distinct 
from privacy, and therefore entails 
additional protection for personal data. 
This was lamented by euro-sceptics, 
and noted with disapproval by Mostyn J 
in the High Court judgment AB, when 
he observed that the right to data 
protection in the EU Charter introduced 
all of the ECHR’s ‘missing parts and 
a great deal more’. The Charter right 
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to data protection has subsequently 
been used by the Court of Appeal 
to disapply conflicting provisions of 
national law, and to broaden the 
circumstances in which individuals 
can claim remedies for breach of 
data protection law. This additional 
protection for individuals afforded 
by the right to data protection could 
potentially be lost post-Brexit. However, 
the incentive for the UK to depart from 
this high level of data protection is 
constrained by the EU data protection’s 
‘adequacy’ framework, as mentioned 
above. 
In essence, the 1995 Data Protection 
Directive provides that data transfers 
from within the EU to ‘third-countries’ 
outside the EU/EEA are only possible 
when an ‘adequate’ level of protection 
can be guaranteed in that third country. 
Pursuant to Article 25 of the Directive, in 
the absence of an adequacy assessment 
by the EU Commission, the Member 
States assess the adequacy of third 
countries. To date, the Commission has 
only recognised 11 third countries 
as ‘adequate’. Article 26 therefore 
allows data flows between EU/EEA 
countries in the absence of an adequacy 
finding, in specified circumstances. For 
instance, ad hoc data transfers can take 
place when the individual concerned 
consents to the transfers, or the transfer 
is necessary for the performance of 
the contract. Other legal mechanisms 
have however also been used to ensure 
that once transferred from the EU/EEA 
personal data is offered an adequate 
level of protection. For instance, the 
entity transferring the data may agree 
with the recipient of the data upon 
standard contractual clauses containing 
safeguards. 
The overall effect of these rules is 
therefore that third countries are held to 
the high level of protection of personal 
data aspired to by the EU when data 
are transferred from the EU to these 
countries. This has been confirmed by 
the jurisprudence of the EU Court of 
Justice. ‘Adequate’ was interpreted as 
‘essentially equivalent’ in the Schrems 
judgment. In that case the Court 
held that this assessment of essential 
equivalence must examine the content 
of the applicable rules in that country as 
well as the practice designed to ensure 
compliance with them. Furthermore, 
the situation should be checked 
periodically in order to ensure that the 
finding of adequacy remains factually 
and legally justified. It followed from 
Schrems that the primary mechanism 
for EU-US data transfers, the ‘Safe 
Harbor’ scheme, was invalidated as 
the US did not offer this essentially 
equivalent protection. In particular, 
the Safe Harbor scheme provided that 
‘national security, public interest, or law 
enforcement requirements’ had primacy 
over its principles, thereby enabling 
certain US authorities to violate the 
rights to privacy and data protection 
of EU individuals in an unjustifiable 
manner. 
The EU is set to replace the 1995 
Data Protection Directive with a new 
‘General Data Protection Regulation’ 
(GDPR) in May 2018. The GDPR retains 
this adequacy-based framework and 
thus, post-Brexit, the UK may need to 
demonstrate that its data protection 
framework offers protection that is 
‘essentially equivalent’ to that offered 
by the EU. It follows from Schrems 
that this adequacy assessment will 
incorporate a holistic interrogation 
of the UK’s legal framework for 
personal data processing, including 
an assessment of the legal provisions 
applicable to data processing for 
national security purposes. 
Assessing the adequacy 
of the UK’s legal 
framework
In its Brexit White Paper, the UK 
Government recognises that the 
stability of data transfers is important 
for many sectors of the UK economy, 
and states that it will seek to maintain 
the stability of these transfers. Members 
of the regulator – the Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) – and 
Government representatives 
initially indicated that the UK might 
consider alternative data protection 
frameworks. However, the Government 
has subsequently confirmed that the 
GDPR will be implemented in May 
2018, while ostensibly leaving open 
the possibility that what is perceived 
to be a more business-friendly approach 
might be adopted at a later stage. 
Indeed, given the current lowest 
common denominator approach to 
compliance with EU data protection 
laws, many suspect that the UK will 
take full advantage of the flexibility 
inherent in the GDPR. Any desire to 
take such advantage of flexibility 
will however be tempered by the 
fact that any variations in legislation 
may convince firms that it more cost 
effective and less cumbersome to host 
data in the EU rather than the UK. 
This flexibility would need to be utilised 
in a way that would not undermine 
the UK’s bid for adequacy. Moreover, 
formal reception of the GDPR into 
the domestic legal order will not 
suffice: the current implementation 
deficiencies will be subject to renewed 
scrutiny and attention will also turn 
to the effectiveness of domestic data 
protection. The UK will need to improve 
its record in order to pass muster on 
these fronts. 
Nevertheless, the most significant 
challenge to a finding of adequacy 
will be the recent finding of the EU 
Court of Justice in the joined cases of 
Tele2 Sverige and Watson. In this 
case, the Court was asked to consider, 
amongst other things, whether its 
previous judgment in Digital Rights 
Ireland, firstly, prohibited general 
and indiscriminate data retention as 
a matter of principle, and, secondly, 
set out ‘mandatory requirements’ 
that subsequent national legislation 
for communications data retention 
and access must respect. The Court 
reached the momentous conclusion in 
Tele2 Sverige and Watson that general 
and indiscriminate data retention 
legislation, even when it serves the 
justified objective of fighting serious 
crime, exceeds what is necessary 
and is therefore disproportionate. 
Thus, in order to comply with the 
EU Charter rights to data protection 
and privacy, telecommunications 
data retention must be targeted on 
the basis of objective criteria, rather 
than general and indiscriminate in 
nature. This finding is at odds with 
the findings of the UK Supreme Court 
in Catt, a judgment concerning the 
police’s powers to collect and retain 
data about the participation of non-
violent individuals (including 91 year 
old Catt) in political protests on its 
Domestic Extremism Database. Lord 
Sumption suggested in that case that 
‘intelligence is necessarily acquired in 
the first instance indiscriminately’ and 
that ‘its analysis can only be judged 
in hindsight’, a finding diametrically 
opposed to that of the EU Court of 
Justice in Tele 2 Sverige and Watson. 
Equally relevant is the fact that 
the UK has only recently adopted 
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the Investigatory Powers Act 
2016, an Act designed to regulate 
interception of communications 
and the acquisition and retention of 
telecommunications data in the UK. 
Section 87 of this Act provides the 
Secretary of State with the power 
to require telecommunications 
operators  to retain electronic 
communications metadata of all 
customers for up to 12 months 
whi le sect ion 136 al lows the 
Secretary to issue ‘bulk acquisition 
warrants’. Pursuant to such warrants, 
telecommunications operators 
are required to disclose general or 
specified electronic metadata they 
possess or can assess (including 
metadata outs ide the UK) to 
intelligence agencies. These provisions 
of the IPA 2016, amongst others, are 
clearly at odds with the EU Court of 
Justice finding in Tele2 Sverige and 
Watson. Moreover, given that the 
findings in Tele2 Sverige and Watson 
are anchored to an interpretation of 
the EU Charter, without amending the 
Charter the EU position will not, and 
cannot, change. The UK post-Brexit 
may therefore be left with a choice 
between its existing mechanism for 
targeting serious crimes (i.e. general 
data retention) and adequacy, which 
allows for uninterrupted data flows 
between the EU and the UK. 
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